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NOTES
GROKSTER NOT THE "SPIRIT IN THE SKY"
INNOVATORS LONG FOR: UNCERTAIN
PROTECTION "FOREVER YOUNG" SINCE
THE BIRTH OF PEER-TO-PEER
BRAD POLIZZANOt
INTRODUCTION
Services and technologies capable of copying or distributing
information-also known as "dual-use products"--may be used to
commit copyright infringement. Recently, copyright holders have
been extremely concerned that digital dual-use technology,
especially on the Internet, has and will continue to facilitate
copyright infringement to the point that their businesses will
crumble.1  For example, there currently is free software-
including peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks-that enables users to
make copyrighted music and movies available for free transfer to
millions. Indeed, a large amount of litigation against developers
of such software has emerged. On one hand, copyright holders
typically assert that these developers should be secondarily liable
for infringement committed by users of their software, since the
t LL.M. Candidate, 2010, New York University School of Law; Associate
Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2009, St. John's University School of
Law; B.S., 2006, University of Michigan. The author would like to thank the late
Professor Joseph Beard for his invaluable help and guidance.
I Many respected, well-known musical artists agree, including: Stevie Wonder:
"[The music industry] must take a very strong position against the stealing of our
writing and music or else those writings and music will become as cheap as the
garbage in the streets"; Nelly: "As an artist you hate for someone to break into your
home and take everything that you've accumulated over the last how many ever
years you've been in this game"; Don Henley: "The works of recording artists are
being stolen and disseminated over the Internet without fair and just compensation
for those artists. This is the way songwriters and singers make their living, and
stealing that music and giving it away for free is not right." MusicUnited.org, What
the Artists and Songwriters Have to Say, httpl/www.musicunited.org/3-artists.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
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developer supported the infringement 2 and the copyright holder
has a legitimate interest in receiving fair compensation for his
works. On the other hand, the developers assert that they should
not be liable for an end-user's behavior because if they were,
future innovators would be significantly deterred from creating
new and improved technologies due to fear of third-party
liability. As a result, courts have been compelled to arrive at a
balance between these fundamentally competing interests.3
Currently, the Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.4 is the way to determine
common law secondary copyright liability as applied to dual-use
products. In Grokster, the Court addressed the issue of whether
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. ("MGM") stated a claim
against P2P network creator Grokster.5 Although the parties
argued over the viability of the two traditional theories of
secondary liability-contributory and vicarious-as applied to
P2P, the Court merely held that MGM stated a cause of action of
inducement-a theory of liability previously not applied in the
secondary copyright liability context.6 As a result of the decision,
all three theories are now available in one's arsenal when
secondary copyright liability is sought.
Grokster's roots trace back to the landmark Supreme Court
copyright decision of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.7 In Sony, copyright holders sued Sony, then a
manufacturer of the Betamax ("VTR"),8 claiming that the
company was contributorily and vicariously liable for
infringement committed by end-users of the VTR when the end-
2 See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003)
(contending that defendant's development of P2P software established third-party
liability).
3 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
([T]his task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one
hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand ... ."); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) ("The more artistic protection is favored, the
more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright
law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.").
4 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
5 See id. at 928.
6 See id. at 927-28, 936-37.
7 464 U.S. 417.
1 Betamax is a now-obsolete video cassette format very similar to the VCR. Id.
at 422-23.
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users taped copyrighted television programs. 9 The Court held
that Sony was not liable because (1) Sony only had constructive
knowledge1 ° of its customers' infringements, which was not
enough to establish vicarious liability;" and (2) the VTR was
"capable of substantial noninfringing uses." 2 This newly created
safe harbor defense and similar claims were raised in the P2P
cases some twenty years later. P2P creators claimed that the
Sony decision shielded them from liability.
When the recording industry commenced suits against
various P2P creators, however, it distinguished Sony from the
P2P networks by focusing on a key characteristic in the nature of
the relationship between the creator and consumer of the
technologies. Unlike Sony, which had no contact with its VTR
customers after the sale of the VTR, the operators of P2P
networks maintained a continuous relationship with their
users. 13 Because Sony's contact with its customers terminated
immediately following the sale, Sony did not actually know which
of its customers committed infringement,14 which led the Court to
conclude that Sony's knowledge of the infringement was merely
constructive, not actual. 5 This continuous relationship, the
recording industry argued, demonstrated that operators of P2P
networks had actual knowledge of the infringing activity,
rendering Sony's safe harbor defense unavailable. In the pre-
Grokster P2P cases that surfaced in the early 2000s, courts'
attempts to ascertain whether Sony exculpated P2P creators
from liability and to apply the two traditional theories of
secondary copyright liability to the complex intricacies of P2P
software often resulted in decisions that tended to blur the
distinctions between the two doctrines. Consequently, the courts
failed to provide future innovators sufficient guidance with
9 See id. at 419-20.
10 Constructive knowledge is "[kinowledge that one using reasonable care or
diligence should have,... that is attributed by law to a given person." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004).
" See Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
12 Id. at 442.
1" See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2003)
("The industry points out that the provider of a service ... has a continuing relation
with its customers .... ").
14 Sony, 464 U.S. at 438.
15 Id. at 439 ("[Sony] ha[s] sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the
fact that [its] customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted material.").
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respect to their potential copyright liability for dual-use
technologies. When the first P2P case, Grokster, finally reached
the Supreme Court on contributory and vicarious liability claims,
innovators expected clarification of and sufficient protection from
secondary copyright liability. They were largely disappointed.
The Grokster decision was a major step backwards in
secondary copyright law for two reasons: (1) it failed to address
the continued viability and scope of contributory and vicarious
liability-the two theories of liability used virtually exclusively in
the secondary copyright infringement context before Grokster;
and (2) it introduced another theory of liability for copyright
holders to use against creators of potentially dual-use
technology. 16 The decision provided future innovators with no
further guidance with respect to potential secondary copyright
liability when creating a dual-use product and expanded the
scope of liability too greatly. Looking forward, future innovators
who sense the slightest possibility of secondary liability now have
less incentive to release new technologies. This result is
antithetical to the goal of copyright-the maximization of public
benefit through the advancement of technology. 17
This Note argues that, since the Court in Grokster failed to
address the unclear state of the law regarding the applicability
of contributory and vicarious liability in the context of a
continuous relationship between the creator and user of dual-use
products and, instead, merely introduced a third form of
secondary copyright liability in inducement, the Court
exacerbated the uncertainty that technological innovators face
regarding the extent of their protection from secondary copyright
liability. Ultimately, the Grokster decision catastrophically
deterred innovators from advancing their newly created
technologies. In fact, contributory and vicarious liability overlap
when there is a continuous relationship between creator and user
of dual-use products. Therefore, in these situations, the two
overlapping theories should be merged into a single theory,
which would provide a more predictable and fair way to
determine secondary liability than under Grokster. Part I of this
Note analyzes the Grokster decision, highlighting how the Court
not only expanded the scope of secondary liability by introducing
16 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941
(2005).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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a previously inapplicable theory of liability, but also failed to
clarify the current state of murkiness that technological
developers face with respect to their subjectivity to secondary
liability. Part II discusses the components of contributory and
vicarious infringement and reveals how the courts in the P2P
cases tended to blur the distinctions between the two doctrines.
Part III proposes a new, meaningful test that determines when a
developer of a dual-use product should be liable for the infringing
acts of its users.
I. THE COURT IN GROKSTER LEFT MANY QUESTIONS
UNANSWERED
When the Court granted certiorari to the Third Circuit case
examining whether the developer of a P2P network was
secondarily liable for the infringing acts of its users, the
recording industry and software developers eagerly awaited a
decision that would bring clarification to the circuit courts' vague
interpretations of the doctrines in this context. This Part
examines the Court's decision in Grokster, explaining how the
Court merely set forth a new rule of secondary copyright liability
rather than providing the clarification that the recording
industry and software developers needed. This Part will also
discuss how the Court's unsatisfactory resolution has deterred
innovators from advancing their creations.
A. The Peer-to-Peer Network: The Recording Industry Takes
Action
P2P networks enabled users to reproduce and distribute
digital files-some of which have copyright protection; the
reproduction of these copyright protected files without the
authorization of the copyright holder constitutes copyright
infringement."i Because developers of P2P networks did not
directly redistribute copyright-protected files without
authorization,19 the music industry's only available mechanism to
obtain injunctions against such developers was to assert claims
of the traditional theories of secondary copyright liability-
contributory and vicarious infringement. Although the music
'" See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941.
19 See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 879 (2004).
2009] 639
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industry most certainly could have and has brought suit against
the users of such networks,2 ° the recording industry felt that such
action was insufficient to substantially thwart the exponential
increase in the unauthorized copying and transferring of digital
files over the Internet that resulted from the birth of the P2P
network. The recording industry's persistence in bringing suits
against the developers of the networks eventually paid off when
the Court enlarged the scope of secondary copyright liability in
Grokster.
B. The Court Introduces the "Inducement" Rule to Copyright
The Court in Grokster considered for the first time whether
creators of P2P networks were secondarily liable for the
actions of users of the networks who committed copyright
infringement and introduced a new secondary copyright liability
cause of action-inducement: "[0]ne who distributes a device
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties."21  Hence, the test for inducement
has three components: (1) distribution of a device; (2) intention of
encouraging third parties to use the device to infringe copyrights;
and (3) acts of infringement by third parties. In Grokster, the
recording industry brought suit against the software creators of
the P2P network Grokster.22 The first and third elements were
easily met since Grokster distributed software that allowed
computer users to exchange digital files on a P2P network.23 The
rigorous analysis dealt with intent. In finding that Grokster had
the requisite intent, the Court emphasized three particular
pieces of evidence: The defendants (1) aimed to capture the
20 See Honeywell To Buy Maker of Bar-Code Scanners, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Oct. 15, 2007, at C2 (stating that the recording industry filed approximately 26,000
file-sharing lawsuits against individuals using P2P networks). In fact, none of these
suits went to trial until the very recent case of Jammie Thomas in Minnesota. Id.
The jury found her guilty of direct infringement for offering twenty-four songs on the
Kazaa file-sharing network and awarded the music industry $222,000 in damages.
Id. On appeal, the court vacated the jury verdict because of erroneous jury
instructions and ordered a new trial. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 1210, 1226-27 (D. Minn. 2008).
21 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919.
22 Id. at 920-21.
1 Id. at 919.
640 [Vol. 83:635
UNCERTAIN PROTECTION
market comprised of former Napster users who had infringed
copyright on the previously existing Napster P2P network;24
(2) failed to develop "mechanisms to diminish the infringing
activity using their software;"25 and (3) earned profits via
advertising that depended on high-volume infringing use.26
Because the Court failed to specify what evidence is needed
to prove unlawful intent, lower courts must struggle to follow the
Grokster Court's guidance in evaluating whether such intent is
present-a circumstance that will likely stifle innovation. 27  It
does seem clear, however, that mere knowledge of direct
infringement falls short of the requisite intent. Thus, one key is
to distinguish between these two mental states: (1) intent to sell
the device despite knowledge of infringing activities, and
(2) intent to encourage third parties to use the device to infringe
copyrights.. This could be extremely difficult when a defendant
knows that users of his dual-use product will commit
infringement. The Grokster Court did point out particular
actions taken by Grokster that collectively gave rise to intent, but
24 Id. at 939 ("[Elfforts to supply services to former Napster users, deprived of
a mechanism to copy and distribute what were overwhelmingly infringing files,
indicate a principal, if not exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about
infringement.").
25 Id. ("[W]e think this evidence underscores [the defendants'] intentional
facilitation of their users' infringement.").
26 Id. at 939-40. Note that "[tihis evidence alone would not justify an inference
of unlawful intent, but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear."
Id. at 940.
27 See Tom Zeller Jr., Trying To Tame an Unruly Technology, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2005, at C1 ("'America's entire innovation sector is now facing a new era of
copyright uncertainty'... [Grokster] 'created a new theory of liability that will tie up
the courts for a long time.' "). This article reflected upon the uncertainty posed by
the Court's inducement rule:
[Tihe court provided little guidance on just how one might determine
whether a company was purposely inducing its users to violate the law,
and in this, many technology advocates saw reason for concern. The
entertainment industry, they argue, can now use the ruling to sue without
restraint, seeking to show bad "intent" or "purpose" behind every
technology it does not like.
[T]he decision's emphasis on finding the "intent" of a company could mire
new technologies in a litigious limbo. Every e-mail message, every
conversation, every cocktail napkin on which an entrepreneur scribbles a
vision for a new technology, Grokster supporters said, could become
evidence in a future lawsuit, making unfettered blue-sky innovation a risky
business without lawyers vetting every move.
2009]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
just one of these standing alone, the Court said, would be
insufficient for a finding of inducement liability.2" Perhaps the
Court meant for the test of intent to be one in which some of the
discussed factors are required but one that is ultimately decided
in light of the facts on a case-by-case basis. In the end,
introducing the theory of inducement to the arena of secondary
copyright liability greatly expanded the scope of liability.
C. The Court's Failure To Address the Traditional Secondary
Liability Claims Undesirably Stifles Innovation
Because the Court failed to harmonize the confusing
opinions of the circuit courts that analyzed the scope of the
traditional theories of secondary copyright liability-contributory
and vicarious infringement-in the context of P2P networks,29
the Court further stifled innovation by maintaining the
uncertainty of liability innovators faced under these doctrines.
Ultimately, the furtherance of public benefit-the fundamental
interest of copyright law3 -was unmistakably nonexistent as an
effect of the Grokster decision. Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution empowered Congress "[tio promote the
[pirogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited
[t]imes to [a]uthors... the exclusive [rnight to their respective
[w]ritings."31 By granting authors limited monopoly rights in the
form of copyrights for artistic expressions,32 the government
fosters an incentive for authors to benefit the public by
contributing their works to the arts and sciences. Some of these
exclusive rights include the right to distribute the copyrighted
28 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
29 See infra Part II.B.
30 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[Copyright law] is intended
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc ..... to
afford greater encouragement to the production of literary (or artistic) works of
lasting benefit to the world.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors."); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7
(1909) (stating that the primary intention of copyright laws is for public benefit)).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with [the
Copyright Act], in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device.").
[Vol. 83:635
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work and to perform or display the work publicly.33 A violation of
one of these rights constitutes copyright infringement. 4 To
maximize the benefits conveyed to the public via copyright,
courts attempted to strike a balance between providing
incentives for authors to create artistic expression and ensuring
public access to works of "[sicience and [the] useful [a]rts"35 by
appropriately imposing liability upon not only direct copyright
infringers,36 but also upon third parties under the theories of
contributory and vicarious liability.3 7 Although the doctrines
have not been codified in statute, 38 both Congress 39 and the
courts 4° recognized them. In essence, by refraining from clearly
articulating the standards of contributory and vicarious liability
for operators of P2P networks, the Court in Grokster did not
provide innovators any piece of mind or incentive to create
artistic expression. Thus, the current state of secondary
copyright law falls tremendously short of maximizing public
benefit.
11 Id. at § 106.
31 Id. at § 501(a).
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36 A direct infringer is defined by the Copyright Act as one "who violates any of
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122."
17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
17 See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1161-62 (2d Cir. 1971). Although courts generally rely on Congress to render
amendments in copyright law, changes are occasionally made judicially in response
to rapid advancements in technology. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984) (stating that when the Copyright Act does
not "plainly mark our course, [the Court] must be circumspect in construing the
scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a
calculus of interests"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) ("When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of [copyright's] basic purpose.").
' See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35 ("The absence of... express language in the
copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright
infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity.").
39 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5775-76 ("A well-established principle of copyright law is that a
person who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an
infringer, including persons who can be considered related or vicarious infringers.").
40 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
929-31 (2005) ("When... it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected
work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative [is] to go
against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of
contributory or vicarious infringement.").
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II. P2P CASES BLURRED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN VICARIOUS
AND CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
ONGOING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPER AND USER
Because P2P networks created a continuous relationship
between the software creator and its users, the courts in the P2P
cases, by applying contributory and vicarious liability, revealed
the tendency to blur the distinction between the doctrines. This
Part first introduces the basic components of contributory and
vicarious liability. Next, it demonstrates that what at first
glance appeared to be confusion in the P2P cases resulting from
the courts' tendencies to blur the distinctions between the
doctrines, in fact, revealed that the doctrines virtually overlap
entirely in the context of a continuous relationship.
A. The Doctrines
1. Contributory Liability
a. Basic Test
Courts often cite Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, Inc.41 for the test of contributory
infringement, which required that a defendant (1) had knowledge
of the infringement, and (2) "induce[d], cause[d], or materially
contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of another."42 For a
finding of contributory infringement, a substantial majority
of courts required relatively specific knowledge and direct
41 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
42 Id. at 1161-62; see also Parker v. Google, Inc., No. 06-3074, 2007 WL 1989660,
at *3 (3d Cir. July 10, 2007) (per curiam) ("To allege a claim of contributory
copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege: (1) direct copyright infringement
of a third-party; (2) knowledge by the defendant that the third-party was directly
infringing; and (3) material contribution to the infringement."); Warner Bros.
Records, Inc. v. Souther, No. 1:05CV279, 2006 WL 1549689, at *2 (W.D.N.C. June
1, 2006) ("[Tlhe essential elements of contributory copyright infringement
are... (1) knowledge, and (2) material contribution."); Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic
Soc'y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[Ihe standard for contributory
infringement has two prongs-the 'knowledge' prong and the 'material contribution'
prong."), modified, 220 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd, 409 F.3d 26
(2d Cir. 2005); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("[Knowledge and participation [are] the touchstones of contributory
infringement."). For purposes of simplicity, this Note labels the second prong
"material contribution."
[Vol. 83:635
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assistance.43 Considered an outgrowth of enterprise liability, the
"common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates or
furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the
prime tortfeasor,"" contributory infringement fostered the
common view that the need to protect copyright monopolies was
justified in such situations:
Consider first a defendant who sells custom-length blank
cassette tapes to a person he knows will use the tapes to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted music for sale to the public.
This seller is quite culpable because he knows exactly who
commits the infringement, understands the nature of the
infringement, and provides assistance that directly supports the
infringement. By contrast, consider a defendant who processes
credit card transactions despite learning that certain
unidentified customers take credit cards in payment for the sale
of infringing goods. This defendant is less culpable than the
seller of blank tapes because his knowledge of identity is less
specific and his support is less directly related to
infringement.4"
b. Sony: A Defense for Creators of Dual-Use Products from
Contributory Liability
In its landmark 1984 decision Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,46 the Court restricted the scope of
contributory liability by refusing to impose liability on a creator
of a dual-use product with mere constructive knowledge of
infringement committed by users of its dual-use product as long
4 See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706-07
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that although defendant's "star pagination" in legal case
reports may allow others to infringe copyrights, this mere constructive knowledge
was insufficient for contributory infringement); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 263-67 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant's knowledge that
its customers, who purchased software that enabled duplication of computer
programs, might commit copyright infringement insufficient for contributory
liability); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that although defendant company
retained some constant control over its system, it could not be charged with
knowledge for contributory infringement until notice of specific infringing acts was
first received).
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 184, 194-95 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
- 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:635
as it "merely [is] capable of substantial noninfringing uses."4" In
Sony, the movie industry sued Sony for distributing a dual-use
product, the VTR, which allowed its users to duplicate live
telecasts without authorization.48 The Court placed a limit on
contributory liability's potentially broad restriction of dual-use
technology by demonstrating that imposing liability on the
noninfringing uses would not necessarily advance fundamental
copyright interests-or, ultimately, society's best interests.
Attaching liability unquestionably would mitigate the negative
effects of infringement, but in particular instances, society would
be harmed overall because of the lost benefits associated
with the noninfringing uses of the dual-use product. The
Court implemented this cost-benefit paradigm via its safe
harbor defense, considering in its analysis not only current
noninfringing uses, but also potential ones.49 Although there
would be no guarantee that potential noninfringing uses would
arise in a dual-use product, the Sony Court's reasoning was
extremely sound since society rarely appreciates all of the
significant benefits of a technology immediately upon its release,
and implementation of today's technology paves the way to the
development of tomorrow's technology.5 °
47 Id. at 442. The Court did not apply this defense to vicarious liability-another
form of secondary copyright liability. See id. at 435 n.17 ("[Tihe question[] of
petitioners' liability under... 'vicarious liability' [is] not nominally before this
Court."). In formulating the defense, the Court adopted from the staple article of
commerce doctrine of patent law:
We recognize there are substantial differences between the patent and
copyright laws. But in both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is
grounded on the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may
require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or
publication to the products or activities that make such duplication
possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance
between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely
symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others
freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly,
the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used
for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.
Id. at 442.
' Id. at 419-20.
41 See id. at 442 ("Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses." (emphasis added)).
' One wonders if Sony was compelled to stop distributing the VTR, whether the
DVD would ever have developed. Consider the statement by Cory Doctorow of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation: "Every time, looking back in hindsight, we can see
that ultimately, each new medium made it easier for people and artists to
UNCERTAIN PROTECTION
Although the VTR, manufactured and sold by Sony, was
used by consumers to record copyrighted television broadcasts,5'
Sony was charged with mere constructive knowledge of the
infringing activity since Sony's contact with its consumers
terminated immediately following the moment of sale; thus, the
safe harbor defense applied.52  Since "time-shifting," which
consisted of recording a television broadcast, viewing it at a later
time, and then deleting the recording, 3 said the Court, was the
primary use of the VTR54 and constituted a "fair use"-meaning
it did not infringe copyright 5 -the VTR, as a result, was "capable
of substantial noninfringing uses."56 Although the movie
communicate with each other. It resulted in a larger, more vibrant entertainment
industry." Julie Keller, Aargh! Britney, Nelly, Battle Pirates, E! ONLINE, Sept. 27,
2002, http://www.eonline.com/uberblogb43944_aarghbritney-nelly-battle-pirates.
html.
5' Sony, 464 U.S. at 419-20.
52 See id. at 438. Clearly, Sony knew some of its users would use the VTR to
infringe copyright. See id. at 439 ("[Defendants] have sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material."). Had Sony maintained some
relationship with its VTR customers after the sale, this would have potentially given
rise to knowledge of specific infringers, and the defense would probably not have
been available.
5 See id. at 421.
Id. at 423.
5 Id. at 433 ("Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use;'
the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use."). The "fair
use" doctrine is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, which provides in pertinent:
[Tihe fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
1 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The Court discussed another reason for concluding that
the defense was met. Indeed, plaintiffs could not prevent other copyright holders
from authorizing time-shifting of their programs. Id. Defendants introduced
evidence that demonstrated at least approximately ten percent of the duplicated
programming was authorized by copyright holders. Id. at 424, 444. This constituted
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industry voiced its strong concern that the VTR would annihilate
the size of live audiences at the time of television telecasts and
dramatically reduce the size of rerun audiences for both movie
and television audiences, 7 the Court felt that time-shifting was a
"fair use" since it "may enlarge the total viewing audience," and
"many producers are willing to allow private time-shifting to
continue, at least for an experimental time period."5 8 If Sony was
held contributorily liable for providing users the means to time-
shift, it "would inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters
in reaching the portion of their audience that is available only
through time-shifting."
59
2. Vicarious Liability
The Second Circuit in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L.
Green Co.,60 articulated the widely accepted vicarious liability
standard, which required the defendant to have (1) a "direct
financial interest" in the infringing activity, and (2) a "right and
ability to" control the infringing activity. 61 Knowledge of the
infringing activity is not an element.62 Vicarious liability in
.a significant quantity"--significant enough for the court to be satisfied of
substantial noninfringing use. Id.
57 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 466
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S.
417. Jack Valenti, the President of the Motion Picture Association of America,
testified that "the VCR is to the motion picture industry and the American public
what the Boston strangler is to the woman alone." Home Recording of Copyrighted
Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982). For an in-depth discussion of the
introduction of the VCR and the subsequent lobbying from both sides, see generally
JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT
OF THE VCR (1987).
58 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442, 443.
19 Id. at 446. The outcome may have been different, however, in the event that
plaintiffs relief affected only plaintiffs works or if the plaintiff spoke "for virtually
all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome." Id.
60 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
61 Id. at 307; see also Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g (USA), Inc., Nos. 93 CIV.
3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1994) ("Financial
benefit and ability to control are the signposts of vicarious liability.").
62 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 (holding that "purposes of copyright law may be best
effectuated" in instances "[wihen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an
obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-
even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being
impaired"); see M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927)
(imposing vicarious liability on the owner of a theater whether or not the infringing
UNCERTAIN PROTECTION
63copyright grew out of the doctrine of respondeat superior, which
holds employers liable for the tortious acts committed by their
employees within the scope of employment. 64 Courts frequently
ascertained the reach of such liability by distinguishing between
the "landlord-tenant" model and the "dance hall" model and then
characterizing the defendant accordingly.65 On the one hand, a
activity occurred "without the direction, knowledge, or consent of the owner"). The
Shapiro Court elaborated further:
The reasons [for not requiring knowledge] have been variously stated.
The protection accorded literary property would be of little value
if... insulation from payment of damages could be secured.. . by merely
refraining from making inquiry. It is the innocent infringer who must
suffer, since he, unlike the copyright owner, either has an opportunity to
guard against the infringement (by diligent inquiry), or at least the ability
to guard against the infringement (by an indemnity agreement... and/or
by insurance).
Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996)
("The concept of vicarious copyright liability was developed in the Second Circuit as
an outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior."); Banff Ltd. v.
Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]he doctrine of respondeat
superior clearly placed vicarious liability for an employee's infringement upon the
employer."); Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324
(D. Mass. 1994) ("The original basis for vicarious liability was founded on the
employer-employee relationship .... ").
64 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004). "In the typical employer-
employee relationship, it is reasonable to presume that the employer is intimately
linked with and responsible for an employee's act of infringement. Indeed, when
acting within the scope of employment, an employee is presumed to be the
employer's agent." Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1109. It then follows that "one of the
principal rationales of vicarious liability [is] the difficulty of obtaining effective relief
against an agent, who is likely to be impecunious." In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious
Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1241-42, 1272 (1984)). Another rationale for vicarious
liability is that it will encourage employers-and perhaps those similarly situated-
to exercise care in hiring, controlling, and supervising their employees to reduce the
likelihood of copyright infringement. Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect
Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 395, 398 (2003).
11 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intl Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 815-16 (9th
Cir. 2007) ("[T]wo lines of cases developed in the first part of the last century: the
absentee landlord cases and the dance hall cases."); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 ("The
Shapiro Court looked at the two lines of cases it perceived as most clearly
relevant."); Yash Raj Films (USA), Inc. v. Bobby Music Co. & Sporting Goods, Inc.,
No. 01 CV 8378 JFB CLP, 2006 WL 2792756, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006)
(considering whether defendant was "more akin to a landlord" or "analogous to a
dance hall owner"); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049
n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("[Clourts have continued to apply [the landlord-tenant and
dance hall] paradigm to third-party infringement cases."); Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at
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case in which a manager of a dance hall leased the premises to a
band that performed copyrighted music without authorization is
"legion"66 with respect to a finding of vicarious liability as long as
the band generated increased profits for the manager from the
performance and the manager could have controlled the
premises.67 Although this factual setting was technically not one
of an employer-employee relationship, it was presumed that the
manager had the same control over the performer as an employer
over an employee.68 Moreover, the manager was in a better
position to bear the costs by distributing them to those deriving a
benefit from the infringement, such as to patrons through price
admission;69 this justification as a basis for liability seemed
reasonable considering that the manager unfairly reaped the
benefits of the performer's behavior.7 ° On the other hand, a
landlord who leased his property at a fixed rate to a tenant
who subsequently committed copyright infringement on the
premises71 did not have nearly the same culpability as a dance
hall owner as long as the landlord exercised no supervision over
the tenant and received no other benefit from the infringing
activity other than the lease payment.7 2  Unlike an employer-
employee relationship, a landlord-tenant relationship does not
give rise to the presumption that one party's acts are attributable
1324 ("[Where along the spectrum of fact patterns from nightclub to landlord does
the defendant stand?").
6 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
11 Id. at 307-08.
6 Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1109.
69 Feder, supra note 19, at 870; see also Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325. The
Polygram Court focused its justification to impose liability in such a situation on risk
allocation:
When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in which identifiable
types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily fair and reasonable to
place responsibility for those losses on the person who profits, even if that
person makes arrangements for others to perform the acts that foreseeably
cause the losses.... The enterprise and the person profiting from it are
better able than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose
act caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to others who
have profited from the enterprise.
Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325.
70 See Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g (USA), Inc., Nos. 93 CIV. 3428(JFK),
73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1994).
"' Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
72 Id. (citing Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938)).
650 [Vol. 83:635
UNCERTAIN PROTECTION
to the other.3 The key difference between the two models is
that unlike a landlord, a dance hall owner could have received
financial gain proportional to the infringing activity and could
have controlled the infringing activity.
B. The Dual- Use Cases Elicit the Blurring
The continuous relationship between the operator and the
user of the P2P network, distinguishable from other litigated
dual-use products, gave rise to the circuit courts blurring the
distinction between contributory and vicarious liability in this
context. This notion appeared in Sony, as the Court not only
acknowledged that commonalities arose between the two
doctrines,74 but also used the terms interchangeably throughout
its opinion.75 This Section analyzes how the courts in dual-use
cases involving the ongoing relationship suggested that the "right
and ability" to control the infringing conduct, an element of
vicarious liability, was, in fact, merely a subset of the "material
contribution" prong of contributory liability and how knowledge
of the infringing activity, an element of contributory liability, is
an implied element of vicarious liability.
11 Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1109. "Such a presumption can arise, however, upon a
factual showing.., where the landlord is more intimately involved with the affairs
of the tenant than might typically be the case." Id. In Shapiro, the court held that
the defendant, who owned a department store in which unauthorized copies of
records were being sold, analogized to the "dance hall" cases because the defendant
was able to supervise the sales and received a fixed percentage of the revenue
generated from the sales. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
74 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17
(1984) ("'[Tlhe lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and
vicarious liability are not clearly drawn'.... [R]easoned analysis of [a] contributory
infringement claim necessarily entails consideration of arguments and case law
which may be forwarded under the other labels...." (quoting Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 457-58 (D.C. Cal. 1979), rev'd
on other grounds, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
1 Kelly M. Maxwell, Note, Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do? A Critical Look
at MGM v. Grokster and the Recommendation of Appropriate P2P Copyright
Infringement Standards, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 335, 342 n.65 (2005) ("Sony
states that vicarious liability can be found if the contributory infringer was, 'in a
position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the
use without permission from the copyright owner,' but vicarious liability is not
imposed in this case." (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 437)). The Seventh Circuit reiterated
this perception since the court was "uncertain" as to the scope of vicarious liability
for a P2P network because it interpreted Sony to have treated vicarious and
contributory infringement "interchangeably." In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
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1. "Right and Ability" To Control in Contributory Liability
When examining secondary copyright claims against a
distributor of a dual-use product who maintained a relationship
with its users, courts typically found that possessing the "right
and ability" to supervise the infringement satisfied the "material
contribution" prong of contributory liability.7" The Sony Court
eloquently demonstrated how "right and ability" to control was
merely a subset of material contribution:
"[C]ontributory infringement" has been applied in a number
of... copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between
the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time
the infringing conduct occurred. In such cases, as in other
situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is
manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position to
control the use of copyrighted works by others and had
authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner.
77
Suppose that Sony still had significant contact with its VTR
customers when some unauthorized copying took place. The
Sony Court implied that, in this situation, the "right and ability"
to control, which justified imposing vicarious liability, in itself,
gave rise to contributory infringement.78 More specifically, this
analysis implied that by failing to control infringing activity
despite having the opportunity to do so, the vicarious infringer
also contributed materially to the infringing conduct. Thus, the
Sony Court acknowledged that the overlap of contributory and
vicarious liability arose when an ongoing relationship was
present.79
76 See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 1971) (discussing that the contributory infringer "was in a
position to police the infringing conduct of its artists" since it programmed the
compositions of the artists); A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1456
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that defendant materially contributed to infringement by
selling blank tapes knowing his customers would use them to conduct infringing
activities).
77 Sony, 464 U.S. at 437. Note, however, that this general situation is
distinguishable from the facts of Sony because "[t]he only contact between Sony and
the users of the [VTR] ... occurred at the moment of sale." Id. at 437-38 (emphasis
added).
71 See id. at 437-38.
79 See id. at 437.
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Since P2P networks typically gave rise to an ongoing
relationship, the courts meshed the two doctrines by suggesting
that failing to exercise or eliminate the "right and ability"
to control the infringing conduct constituted a "material
contribution" to the infringing conduct."0 Consider the first P2P
case to reach the circuit courts, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc.81 In Napster, the defendants distributed software-through
its website for no charge-that allowed its users to transfer
copies of MP3 files8 2 from one computer to another via the
Internet. 3 In analyzing the vicarious liability claim, the court
emphasized that "[tlo escape the imposition of vicarious liability,
80 See Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 838-39 (2005).
81 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), afftd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
S2 An MP3 is a condensed digital format for storing audio recordings, making
them very easy to transfer over P2P networks. Id. at 1011.
8 Id. Once the software was installed, a user typically connected to the Napster
network. See id. at 1012. The software then searched for files on the user's hard
drive suitable for exchange, uploaded the names of the files onto Napster's servers,
and rendered the files part of a "collective directory" available for transfer while the
user remained connected to Napster. Id. This demonstrated how files became
available for download on the system. To locate available files for download, a user
connected to the network and entered the name of a song or artist in a search
window provided by the software. Id. A Napster server compiled a list of all the file
names that contained the search terms and transmitted the list to the user. Id. To
enable a searching user to obtain a file from the list, the Napster server obtained the
Internet address of that user and the user who possessed the file, communicated the
Internet address of the possessor to the searcher, and as a result, allowed a
connection to be established between the two users for a transfer to take place. Id.
The actual transfer never passed through Napster's servers. A&M Records, Inc., v.
Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 239
F.3d 1004. Indeed, the recording industry, at the time, greatly feared that large-
scale music exchanging on such a network would significantly diminish music
sales. See Courtney Macavinta, Recording Industry Sues Music Start-Up, Cites
Black Market, CNET NEWS.CoM, Dec. 7, 1999, http://news.cnet.com2100-1023-
234092.html. Cary Sherman, senior executive vice president of the RIAA said:
"Napster is about facilitating piracy and trying to build a business on the backs of
artists and copyright owners." Id. This claim seemed at least somewhat legitimate at
the time, considering that 10,000 files per second were shared over the Napster
system. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902. Many commentators, however, argued that
this technology could be used to create new business models to offer consumers
recordings more quickly and conveniently, while simultaneously fairly compensating
copyright holders. See Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 38 (2007)
("[W]e find that find that file sharing has had no statistically significant effect on
purchases of the average album .... ."); Katie Dean, P2P Tilts Toward Legitimacy,
WIRED.cOM, Nov. 24, 2004, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/20041
11/65836.
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the reserved right to police must be exercised to its fullest
extent."84 By implementing this practice, the P2P operator
would, in effect, have altered the assistance for infringing
activity provided to its users in such a way to likely render the
assistance immaterial; consequently, the operator was no longer
contributorily liable, since the "material contribution" vanished.
Fully exercising the right and ability to control the infringing
conduct, implied the Napster Court, directly paralleled an
elimination of "material contribution" to the infringing activity.
Clearly, the "right and ability" to control prong and the "material
contribution" prong rose and fell together. Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit, in the next P2P case to reach the circuit courts,
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,5 also meshed the two
doctrines. Unique to this software was that the creator
encrypted all communication between users, rendering it
impossible for the operator to ascertain which specific files were
in transfer.16  The court made the suggestion that vicarious
liability could have been applied in Sony on the theory that "Sony
could have reduced the likelihood of infringement.., by a design
change" and that Aimster similarly could have done so by
"eliminating the encryption feature and monitoring the use being
made of its system.""7 The court's message was clear: If Aimster
changed the design of the system in such a way that enabled the
operator to supervise and control the infringing conduct,
resulting in significantly reduced infringing activity, vicarious
liability could not be imposed. Another outcome of such action
would be the disappearance of any "material contribution," as
one could not have contributed materially if the infringing
activity was minimal. Once again, a court in a P2P case
analyzing an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer
and secondary infringer demonstrated the tendency to interlock
the "right and ability" to control and "material contribution"
prongs.
8 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
8 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
86 Id. at 646. The court also explained the apparent effect of the software: "In
principle,... the purchase of a single CD could be levered into the distribution
within days or even hours of millions of identical, near-perfect. . . copies of the
music recorded on the CD.. . ." Id.
17 Id. at 654. The Aimster Court actually interpreted the Sony holding to have
relieved Sony of vicarious liability. Id.
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2. Knowledge Implied in Vicarious Liability
Although knowledge of the infringing activity is not an
element of vicarious liability,"8 in the context of a dual-use
product where there was an ongoing relationship between the
operator of the software and the user, courts implied that in
order to satisfy the "right and ability to control" prong, the
operator must have known of this ability to control the infringing
conduct, which, in turn, implied that there was knowledge
of the infringing activity. 9 In fact, the landlord-tenant cases,
frequently cited by courts to demonstrate a situation in which no
vicarious liability was present,90 suggest that a lack of knowledge
of the infringing activity on the landlord's part was considered in
the analysis in order to render no imposition of secondary
copyright liability.9' In the dual-use context of Sony, the
Supreme Court asserted:
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this case,
it must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use
that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the
imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.
92
s See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 778 F.2d 89,
92 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding defendant vicariously liable for the unauthorized
publishing of a photograph on a magazine cover since defendant "[alt the very
least... exercised control over the infringement"); Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g
(USA), Inc., No. 93 Civ. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17,
1994) ("The mere fact that [defendants] could have policed the exhibitors at great
expense is insufficient to impose vicarious liability. . .
0 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
91 See Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) ("[The landlords]
received nothing, and were not entitled to receive anything through [the tenant's]
acts of infringement, and there is no proof that either of them knew that acts of
infringement were proposed at the time when the lease was made." (emphasis
added)); see also Vernon Music Corp. v. First Dev. Corp., No. 83-0645-MA, 1984 WL
8146, at *1 (D. Mass. June 19, 1984) (holding a landlord corporation that "merely
owns and leases the property on which" its tenants committed copyright
infringement not vicariously liable because it did not "control" the infringing
activity); Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (holding that
because the landlord was "without any knowledge whatever of a threatened
infringement" when he entered into the lease, secondary liability could not be
imposed).
92 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
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The Sony Court, by holding that vicarious liability could not
be imposed if a defendant had mere constructive knowledge of
the infringing activity, implicitly suggested that a higher degree
of knowledge could give rise to vicarious liability. Why would the
court otherwise explicitly state that vicarious liability could not
be imposed due to mere constructive knowledge? Evidently,
knowledge was part of the vicarious liability analysis. Suppose
that Sony in fact had an ongoing relationship with its customers,
that is, Sony still had the ability to stop the infringing
conduct after it was sold. In this situation, if Sony specifically
knew which of its users were using the equipment to infringe
copyright, it would then have had the ability to control the
conduct. To clarify, the Court dismissed the vicarious liability
claim because Sony did not have actual knowledge that
infringing activity was occurring at the moment of sale, and thus
had no ability to control the infringing conduct.
Since Sony was controlling law in the P2P cases, the courts
also sought to determine if actual knowledge was present when
evaluating whether the creator of the P2P network had the
ability to monitor the infringing conduct. For example, the Ninth
Circuit in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.93
concluded that because the software here, unlike that in
Napster,94 contained no central index system that enabled the
defendants to locate and throw specific infringers off the
network,95 the defendants did not know which specific users
committed infringing activity, and thus could not block any
individual user's access to exchanging files.96 Additionally, the
court in Napster concluded that the defendant's act of policing
the network to prevent the exchange of copyrighted material
93 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Although this
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, the court's analysis is still valuable to
the study of copyright infringement in this context. The Supreme Court explicitly
rejected little, if any, of the circuit court's analysis of the contributory and vicarious
liability claims. See Tiffany A. Parcher, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Grokster
and Sony: Using Factual Comparisons To Uncover the Legal Rule, 54 UCLA L. REV.
509, 516 (2006) ("[The Court] did not reverse or affirm the Ninth Circuit's holding
that Grokster's software was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.").
"' The "Napster system employed a proprietary centralized indexing software
architecture in which a collective index of available files was maintained on servers
it owned and operated." Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1159.
" See id. at 1163 ("In the context of this case, the software design is of great
import.").
' Id. at 1165.
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gave rise to the "right and ability" to control the infringing
conduct." The defendants must have known of the ongoing
infringing activity in order to attempt to prevent it. Indeed, the
evidence certainly indicated that this was the case.9
III. THE HYBRID RULE
Because the Sony, Napster, Aimster, and Grokster Courts
quite naturally blurred the distinctions between contributory and
vicarious infringement in the context of an ongoing relationship
between a developer and a user of a dual-use product, it would be
most useful for innovators to simply combine the doctrines in this
context into a "hybrid" rule. This standard should determine
whether secondary liability should be imposed, consisting of the
three elements considered by both contributory and vicarious
liability: (1) direct financial benefit from the infringing activity;
(2) actual knowledge of the infringing activity; and (3) the ability
to directly terminate the infringing activity. 9 Sony's safe harbor
rule should continue to serve as a defense to a claim of such
liability because it is still good law and strikes a fair balance
between protecting copyrighted works and stimulating
innovation of technology. Ultimately, in this age of rapidly
developing technology in which creators themselves may not
anticipate particular uses of a technology, implementation of this
rule to digital technology should provide sufficient guidance to
both start-up companies and large organizations as to what
features of potential technologies may generate liability, while
simultaneously furthering public benefit. This Part
demonstrates the proper scope of each prong, keeping in mind
how courts interpreted them in order to best effectuate the
fundamental principles of copyright law.
97 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001)
("The ability to block infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason
whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to supervise."), affd, 284 F.3d 1091
(9th Cir. 2002); see also Kelly M. Maxwell, Note, Software Doesn't Infringe, Users
Do? A Critical Look at MGM v. Grokster & the Recommendation of Appropriate P2P
Copyright Infringement Standards, 13 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 335, 359 (2005)
("The Napster... court found that the defendant had the right and ability to
supervise its users' conduct when it began to police its network in preventing the
exchange of copyrighted material.").
91 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
9 Of course, this proposal has no bearing upon the distinct inducement rule
announced in Grokster.
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A. Direct Financial Interest
A plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant's direct and
obvious financial interest in the infringing activity, 100 which can
be shown if the infringing activity was the primary "draw" for
users to the product. 1 1 The Ninth Circuit's analyses in the
Napster and Grokster cases 10 2 delineated specific forms of direct
financial gain: (1) increase in userbase directly generating more
revenue, 103 and (2) advertising revenue. 0 4  A direct financial
interest was found in Napster: "Napster's future revenue is
directly dependent upon 'increases in userbase.' More users
register with the Napster system as the 'quality and quantity of
available music increases.' "105 Similarly, a direct financial
interest based on advertising revenue was also undisputed in
Grokster. °6 The Court's analysis of the facts pertinent to the
revenue as direct financial gain provides guidance:
As the number of users of each program increases, advertising
opportunities become worth more .... [Here], the evidence
shows that substantive volume is a function of free access to
copyrighted work. Users seeking [copyrighted works] are
certain to be far more numerous than those seeking a free
Decameron, and [the defendants have] translated that demand
into dollars.' 07
100 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963);
see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930
(2005).
101 Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (C.D. Cal.
2001). The Adobe Court held that the infringement is the "draw" in the event that
"the very success of the landlord's venture depends on the counterfeiting activity
(and thus the landlord has every incentive to allow the activity to continue)." Id. at
1051.
102 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in Aimster did not analyze whether the
facts satisfied the vicarious liability elements, and this Note is hesitant to
incorporate the relevant district court's analysis because the court was "less
confident than the district judge... that the recording industry would... be likely
to prevail on the issue of vicarious infringement." In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
103 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001), affd,
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
104 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1164
(9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
105 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
106 Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164.
107 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 926
(2005).
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On the other hand, as was consistently held in the "landlord-
tenant" cases, there was no direct financial benefit if a mere fixed
rate generated the third-party's revenue; in other words, there
was no revenue causally related to the infringing activity. 0 s
Indeed, by limiting the financial interest to a direct one, as
many courts have done, the potential for limitless expansion of
liability-which in turn would significantly stifle innovation-
would be restricted. Without question, some courts extended the
reach of vicarious liability beyond that of a situation analogous
to an employer-employee relationship by merely requiring an
indirect financial benefit, which could be demonstrated by the
infringing acts merely enhancing "the attractiveness of the venue
to potential customers";09 "attractiveness," however, is too vague
of a standard, so the requirement should be restricted to direct
financial gain."0
108 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
109 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1996)
("In this case, the sale of pirated recordings at the Cherry Auction swap meet is a
'draw' for customers, as was the performance of pirated music in the dance hall
cases and their progeny."); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., No. 88 C
2856, 1988 WL 128691, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1988) (holding that since the
infringement "create[d] a more attractive environment for customers," there was a
financial interest); William Sloan Coats, et al., Pre- and Post- Grokster Copyright
Infringement Liability for Secondary and Tertiary Parties, 842 PRACTISING L. INST.
221, 230 (2005) ("There is some disagreement among the circuit courts as to how
direct the connection between the financial benefit and the infringing activity must
be."). Some courts held that the "draw" need not be substantial, with the focus
remaining on whether the infringing activity merely caused more people to
potentially facilitate it, as opposed to requiring a direct financial increase resulting
from augmented infringement. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that Fonovisa's "draw" test was satisfied as long as the infringing
activity was "a draw" for customers and that the "draw" need not be "substantial"
(emphasis added)). Another seemingly expansive interpretation for finding a
financial benefit was if there was merely "some continuing connection between the
[defendant and the direct infringer] in regard to the infringing activity." Banff Ltd.
v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying this theory in a
parent-subsidiary context).
110 See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050-51
(C.D. Cal. 2001) ("The direct financial benefit must stem from the fact that
substantial numbers of customers are drawn to a venue with the explicit purpose of
purchasing counterfeit goods.... Without [this] requirement... [there would be]
limitless expansion of vicarious liability into spheres wholly unintended .... "). In
fact, the Adobe court required the infringing activity to be "the 'draw' for customers
to the venue." Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
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B. Knowledge with Sony's Safe Harbor
Sony articulated the standard for knowledge: Specific
knowledge of the infringing activity, perhaps by knowing the
precise identity of the infringer and the works being infringed.111
If mere constructive knowledge is demonstrated, then the claim
is subject to the Sony safe harbor.112 Many believe that this
construction is the best way to further public benefit-when the
benefits of the noninfringing uses outweigh the harms of the
infringing uses and the third party cannot learn of the specific
infringers when the infringement occurs, it is best to leave the
product on the market.113
" See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgm't, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162-63 (2d Cir. 1971).
112 See supra notes 46-48, 51-52 and accompanying text; see also Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that there was no
contributory infringement because defendant knew only that its customers might
use its product to commit copyright infringement and because the product was
capable of substantial noninfringing uses); Adobe, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (holding
that a letter sent by a copyright holder to proprietors of computer fairs describing
alleged infringing activities taking place at proprietors' shows was insufficient to
establish summary judgment on defendants' knowledge).
11 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the Court, in
the two concurring opinions of Grokster, revealed disagreement as to what
constituted "substantial." Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring Grokster opinion,
stated that the Sony safe harbor provided a defense if the product had "substantial"
or "commercially significant" noninfringing uses. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Because "the
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a reasonable
prospect that substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely
to develop over time," the lower courts "should not have ruled dispositively on the
contributory infringement charge." Id. at 948. Critical to Ginsburg's analysis was
that the evidence presented by defendants demonstrating that noninfringing uses
"reveal[] mostly anecdotal evidence ... of authorized copyrighted works or public
domain works available online and shared through peer-to-peer networks, and
general statements about the benefits of peer-to-peer technology." Id. at 946.
Moreover, "[elven if the absolute number of noninfringing files copied.., is large, it
does not follow that the products are therefore put to substantial noninfringing
uses .... The number of noninfringing copies may be reflective of, and dwarfed by,
the huge total volume of files shared." Id. at 948. In contrast, Justice Breyer
advocated that contributory liability does not attach "unless the product in question
will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights." Id. at 957 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer specifically pointed out that in Sony, since the Public
Broadcasting Service, professional sports leagues, and religious broadcasting all
authorized home taping, to demonstrate "'significant enough numbers to create a
substantial market for a noninfringing use of the' VCR..., these circumstances
alone constituted a sufficient basis for rejecting the imposition of [contributory]
liability." Id. at 951 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 447 (1984)). Because approximately ten percent of the files exchanged on
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In the P2P cases, the courts found specific knowledge if the
defendant was notified of the specific infringing acts committed
by its users, and the courts found constructive knowledge
only if the developer had no available mechanism to locate
specific infringers on the network and throw them off. To
demonstrate such a specific knowledge analysis in a P2P
situation, consider the Napster defendant. The court found
specific knowledge because the recording industry notified the
defendant multiple times of specific infringing acts committed by
users of its software, and the defendants could have located and
thrown those users off the network.'14 In contrast, the defendant
defendants' P2P software were noninfringing, which was similar to the percentage
observed in Sony, combined with the "adequate foundation where there is a
reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate uses over time," Sony's standard was
met and summary judgment should have been granted to dismiss the contributory
liability claim. Id. at 953-54 ("[The] software permits the exchange of any sort of
digital file-whether that file does, or does not, contain copyrighted material. As
more and more uncopyrighted information is stored in swappable form, it seems a
likely inference that lawful peer-to-peer sharing will become increasingly
prevalent."). Some of these lawful uses included the swapping of research
information, public domain films, historical recordings and digital educational
materials, and digital photos. Id. at 954. Ultimately, this intra-Court split, of which
either interpretation might attract a majority of justices in a future case, led many
copyright commentators to criticize the majority Grokster decision for failing to
clarify the definition of "substantial noninfringing use" in a situation that was ripe
for it. See Darrin Keith Henning, Intellectual Property-Copyright & Internet Law-
"The Big Chill". The Supreme Court Adopts an Inducement Standard for Third-Party
Copyright Infringement Liability, Leaving Innovation in the Cold, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 165, 202 (2006) ("[Tlhe Grokster... decision will have a direct chilling
effect in the high-tech world.., because of the Court's failure to affirm the balance
struck in Sony, thereby creating uncertainty regarding the future of its safe-harbor
doctrine ... ."); Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 347, 354 (2005) (discussing that since the Court "declined to specify the
precise content of the substantiality standard" and "[iinstead... offered the
copyright industries another tool for pursuing wrongdoers that purported to focus on
intent rather than design," the "compromise likely will prove unstable"); Timothy K.
Andrews, Comment, Control Content, Not Innovation: Why Hollywood Should
Embrace Peer-to-Peer Technology Despite the MGM v. Grokster Battle, 25 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 383, 423 (2005) ("By distinguishing Sony, the Court avoids answering
the most disputed issue before it: What level of infringing use qualifies as
'substantial'?"); David Post, The Impact of 'Grokster,' NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 2005, at 10
("Uncertainty remains.., about how this will play out in the future-and in
particular, about the precise meaning of 'capable of substantial noninfringing
use.' ").
114 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001), affd,
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). "[A] document authored by Napster co-founder Sean
Parker mentioned the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses
since they are exchanging pirated music .... [Tihe Recording Industry Association
of America ('RIAA') informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files, some of
2009]
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in Grokster had mere constructive knowledge of infringing
activity because, under the system's decentralized design, the
defendants were unable to locate and throw off any specific
infringers. 115
C. Right and Ability To Control
Because of the apparent overlap between Gershwin's
"material contribution" prong and Grokster's "inducement"
rule,1 ' it seems reasonable to use the "right and ability" to
control prong for the "hybrid" rule as this standard is merely a
subset of "material contribution." Whether a party had the "right
and ability" to control the infringing conduct is extremely fact-
specific and should depend on several factors, including whether
the defendant controlled the infringing activity via its rules
which are still available." Id. at 1020 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because some of the files were still available, this seems to give rise to the fact that
the Napster operators knew of some specific users who committed infringement,
since they could easily search for them. But see Yen, supra note 80, at 837
(disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the evidence in Napster, arguing
that Napster had constructive knowledge of infringement but to a greater degree
than Sony in the Sony case). Because the Napster Court found actual knowledge, no
determination was made as to whether the Napster P2P network was "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
115 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162
(9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Under a decentralized software design,
the software broadcasted a search request to all the computers on the network and
then a search of the individual index files was conducted, with the collective results
routed back to the requesting computer. Id. at 1159. The software did not collect the
results in any central location during the search. This construction meant that if the
defendants "'closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control,
users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption.'"
Id. at 1163 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp.
2d. 1029, 1041 (C. D. Cal. 2003)).
116 Compare Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919 ("[O]ne who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties." (emphasis added)), with Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162
("[Olne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). The Grokster Court's
inducement theory will seem to capture a substantial number of those who
materially contribute to infringement but have more than a mere right and ability to
supervise. Yet, if one does not induce and merely has a right and ability to supervise,
the "material contribution" prong is still satisfied. See supra notes 76-87 and
accompanying text. The "inducement" theory will certainly include the former
scenario and likely not the latter.
UNCERTAIN PROTECTION
and regulations, took reasonable policing measures to ensure
regulations were being followed, or promoted the mechanism in
which the direct infringement occurred.'17 This should encourage
innovators to create products that enable them to throw users
who infringe off their networks.
Analyzing the facts of Napster and Grokster under the
proposed factors reveals that there was a "right and ability" to
supervise the conduct only if the structure of the software
enabled the developer to terminate specific infringing activity;
of course, it seems unjust to impose liability if no control could
be exerted because there would be no incentive to take such
action. On one hand, in Napster, Napster "expressly reserve[d]
the 'right to refuse service and terminate accounts ... for any
reason in Napster's sole discretion, with or without cause.' ,118
Additionally, Napster "ha[d] the ability to locate infringing
material listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate
users' access to the system.""9 These factors, combined with the
fact that "as much as eighty-seven percent of the files available
on Napster may be copyrighted,"20 gave rise to Napster's right
and ability to supervise. On the other hand, although the
defendant in Grokster "reserved the right to terminate" access,
there was no "registration and log-in process" for software users,
giving Grokster "no ability to actually terminate access to
filesharing functions."'2 ' Nor did Grokster have a "point of
access for filtering or searching for infringing files, since
117 Adobe, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,
76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996)).
I" Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
119 Id. at 1024.
120 Id. at 1013 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,
911 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
121 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1165
(9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Certainly, Grokster could have shut down
the operations altogether, but the court held this to be an insufficient argument to
give rise to a right and ability to control the infringing conduct:
[T]he alleged ability to shut down operations altogether is more akin to the
ability to close down an entire swap meet or stop distributing software
altogether, rather than the ability to exclude individual participants, a
practice of policing aisles, an ability to block individual users directly at the
point of log-in, or an ability to delete individual filenames from one's own
computer.
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infringing material and index information d[id] not pass through
defendants' computers."122 As a result, there was no right and
ability to supervise the infringing activity.
CONCLUSION
Innovators experienced a serious letdown after the Supreme
Court decided Grokster. Not only did the Grokster Court fail to
harmonize the circuit courts' tendency to blur the distinction
between contributory and vicarious liability, it also brought to
life a third theory of secondary copyright liability-inducement.
The effect thereof was to add to an already existing uncertainty
of liability that innovators must deal with when contemplating
whether to develop a new potentially dual-use product. This
raises the question: What, if anything, can technology companies
do to steer clear of secondary liability for distributing dual-use
products? 2 3  Many commentators respond with a blank
expression or a mere shrug.
Since it is quite apparent that the blurring of the traditional
doctrines of secondary liability was a natural consequence of the
continuous relationship between the creator and user of a dual-
use product, the most reasonable way to bring clarification to this
nebulous area of law is to combine the doctrines into a simple,
straightforward test. The effect could be profound as future
innovators would finally have a sense of certainty surrounding
the scope of potential copyright infringement issues. This would
indeed maximize the enhancement of technology, and ultimately,
copyright's fundamental goal-public benefit.
122 Id. Although Grokster stripped itself of the ability to control P2P users'
conduct, and accordingly, exculpated itself from vicarious liability, such "affirmative
steps" to avoid control of the infringing activity ended up rendering Grokster liable
under the new inducement rule. The "right and ability" to supervise prong is
intended to absolve parties who do not take such affirmative steps to remove control
over the conduct and never had any control in the first place.
123 Parcher, supra note 93, at 512.
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